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The Fiscal Impact of the MPCP in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008

Executive Summary
Throughout the history of publicly-funded voucher programs – enacted and proposed – the impact on
taxpayers has been a recurring issue. As the nation’s longest-running program, the Milwaukee Parent
Choice Program (MPCP) provides an important case study. The fiscal impact of Milwaukee’s program
has evolved in very significant ways over its 18-year history, both in size, as the program grew, and in its
allocation among different groups of taxpayers – Milwaukee property taxpayers, non-Milwaukee property
taxpayers, and Wisconsin state taxpayers. This report closely examines the features of the MPCP funding
formula, and its interaction with the state’s regular district funding formula over the program’s history to
better understand the impact on taxpayers.
The report’s first set of key findings assesses the net impact on taxpayers of the MPCP over the life of the
program, compared to likely scenarios had the MPCP never existed:
(1) The size of the net impact is somewhat sensitive to the assumed scenarios in the absence of the
MPCP, but for most likely scenarios the net impact is positive taxpayer savings. One representative
scenario implies taxpayer savings rose from $1.6 million in FY94 to $24.6 million in FY07 and $31.9
million in FY08, as depicted in Figure ES-1. The report provides alternative scenarios, with larger and
smaller impacts.
Figure ES-1: Potential Taxpayer Gains from the MPCP
(assumption: 90% of voucher students would otherwise have enrolled in MPS)
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The source of taxpayer savings is the difference between the size of the voucher and the per pupil amount
of state and local revenues that would have gone to the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) in the absence
of the MPCP. According to data on revenue limits per pupil from the Wisconsin Department of Public
Instruction (DPI), the difference was $2,332 in FY07 and $2,640 in FY08.
The other main determinant of the net fiscal impact is the percent of MPCP enrollees that would have
attended public schools in the absence of the program. Different observers evaluate different pieces of
evidence on this question in varying ways. The rate of 90% assumed in Figure ES-1 is a scenario that is
based on scientific evidence from voucher lotteries in other cities; it is also consistent with evidence on
declining private school enrollment in Milwaukee prior to the MPCP and elsewhere.
The report’s second set of key findings examines the allocation of the net impact among Milwaukee
property taxpayers, non-Milwaukee property taxpayers, and Wisconsin state taxpayers. This is very much
dependent on the structure of the funding formulas.
(2) Wisconsin’s regular district funding formulas provide an informative benchmark for comparison.
These formulas have two key features. First, they are enrollment-sensitive in the long run. Second, any
net savings that would free up state aid is automatically directed to a reduction in property taxes around
the state. With these features, if the state had funded the voucher program by adapting the regular district
funding formulas, the net taxpayer savings would have been shared among Milwaukee property taxpayers
and non-Milwaukee property taxpayers. Figure ES-2 illustrates one way the net impact depicted in ES-1
might have been allocated under this mechanism.
Figure ES-2: Allocation of the Net Voucher Impact Under General Aid and Revenue Formulas
(assumptions: 90% voucher students from MPS; total of aid + voucher expenditures held constant)
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(3) Instead, Wisconsin developed a specific MPCP funding mechanism, which has been modified over the
life of the program. Under this mechanism, Milwaukee property taxpayers have been adversely affected,
unlike the benchmark case discussed above. The net beneficiaries have primarily been non-Milwaukee
property taxpayers and state taxpayers. Figure ES-3 provides an estimate of how the net impact depicted
in ES-1 was allocated under the MPCP formula, as it evolved from FY94 to FY08.
Figure ES-3: Allocation of the Net Voucher Impact Under the MPCP Formula

(assumptions: 90% voucher students from MPS; state share of public education held constant at 2/3)

$100,000,000

$75,000,000

$50,000,000

$25,000,000

$0

-$25,000,000

-$50,000,000
FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08
Milwaukee property taxpayers

Other property taxpayers

State taxpayers

Milwaukee Public Schools

Early in the history of the program, when enrollments were small and impacts were modest, MPS funding
was maintained as voucher students left MPS. This raised per pupil revenues in MPS, while increases in
Milwaukee property taxes paid for the vouchers. The subsequent history of the MPCP formula included
some changes that helped integrate funding with the regular district formulas, and other changes that
helped ameliorate the adverse impact on Milwaukee. However, some of the initial features remained
intact, so as the program grew, the adverse impact on Milwaukee grew as well.
Specifically, the MPCP funding mechanism continues to deduct aid from MPS for 45% of the voucher
expenses, even though the general aid formulas no longer allocate any funds to MPS for voucher students.
MPS is allowed to recoup these funds by raising the property tax. The net result is an adverse impact on
Milwaukee property taxpayers due to this funding mechanism. By contrast, other taxpayers benefit from
the MPCP, since the funds that would otherwise be allocated to MPS for these students are freed up.
This benefit outweighs the direct state expenditures for 55% of the vouchers.
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Under the estimate depicted in ES-3, by FY07, the $24.6 million net benefit was allocated as a $42.3
million savings for non-Milwaukee property taxpayers and a $29.3 million savings for Wisconsin state
taxpayers, offset by a $47.0 million adverse impact on Milwaukee property taxpayers. In response to
this situation, the state appropriated $7.4 million of property tax relief for Milwaukee in FY08, in lieu of
proposals to reform the MPCP formula itself.
The history of the MPCP illustrates how voucher programs can provide significant taxpayer savings,
when students voluntarily choose programs that draw less on public funds than the schools they would
otherwise attend. However, the same history also illustrates that if the funding formulas are not carefully
constructed, some groups of taxpayers may be adversely affected instead of sharing in the net savings. The
initial funding mechanism may have been well-designed for the purpose at hand, when the program was
small. However, as the program grew, the mechanism carried unintended distributional consequences.
Attempts to reform the mechanism have achieved some success, but the vestiges of the initial system
continue to drive the allocation of burdens and benefits, even as the program has outgrown the funding
system’s origins.
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Introduction
Throughout the history of publicly-funded voucher programs – enacted and proposed – the impact on
taxpayers has been a recurring issue. As the nation’s longest-running program, the Milwaukee Parent
Choice Program (MPCP) provides an important case study. The fiscal impact of Milwaukee’s program
has evolved in very significant ways over its 18-year history, both in size (as the program grew) and in its
allocation among different groups of taxpayers – Milwaukee property taxpayers, non-Milwaukee property
taxpayers, and Wisconsin state taxpayers. This report closely examines the features of the MPCP funding
formula, and its interaction with the state’s regular district funding formula over the program’s history to
better understand the impact on taxpayers.2
The fiscal impact of vouchers can be broken down into two distinct questions: (i) the amount of public
funds potentially freed up by the transfer of students from district schools to voucher schools; and (ii) the
allocation of those funds among various taxpayers by the funding formulas.
With regard to the first question, the MPCP has long featured a voucher that is significantly below
the per pupil revenues in the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS). This difference provides significant
potential taxpayer savings, much like those that would be generated by voluntary enrollment shifts from
high-spending to low-spending districts. The magnitude of these potential savings depends on the
enrollments, and the number of voucher-users who would have attended MPS in their absence.
These variables are examined in the first part of this report to estimate the net impact of the MPCP
over the life of the program, compared to likely scenarios had the MPCP never existed. The size of the
net impact is somewhat sensitive to assumptions, but for most likely scenarios the net impact is positive
taxpayer savings.
The second question is whether the funding system is structured to deliver these potential savings to the
taxpayers, and, if so, which ones – state taxpayers, Milwaukee property taxpayers, or property taxpayers in

1

I would like to acknowledge the very helpful comments of Anneliese Dickman, Andrew Rotherham, Andrew Reschovsky,
and George Mitchell. An advance copy of this report was reviewed by the Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau and
the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction. I greatly benefited from discussion at my presentation to the SCDP
Research Advisory Board. John Witte provided helpful advice and a set of enrollment data. Finally, I received excellent
research assistance from Jeff Dean.

2

The term “impact on taxpayers” should be construed broadly to include either actual taxes paid or redirection of tax
money to/from other public expenditures to offset the impact on general funds.
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other districts? The answer depends on both the state’s district funding formula and the voucher funding
formula.
The Wisconsin school funding system is largely driven by enrollment, a fact that should, in principle, make
it highly compatible with a system of school choice, where “the dollar follows the child.” In addition, the
savings from enrollment shifts to districts with lower expenditures are automatically shared by property
taxpayers across the state. It is a system that could, at least in principle, be adapted for funding of the
voucher program, with comparable results. However, Wisconsin chose not to follow the natural template
of the general funding formula when it decided how to fund the MPCP.
Instead, the state has adopted a series of voucher funding formulas, each of which has allocated the
potential savings in a somewhat different fashion. One constant issue, however, has been that none of the
savings are shared by the property taxpayers of Milwaukee – their taxes have been consistently raised by
the formula. Rather, the savings generated by the MPCP have generally accrued to property taxpayers
outside of Milwaukee and/or to state taxpayers. This “funding flaw” (as it is commonly referred to) has
been generally recognized among policy-makers and interest groups in Wisconsin. Various modifications
to the formula over the years have attempted to ameliorate this adverse impact, and further reforms have
been proposed (most recently in the budget deliberations for the FY08-09 biennium), but the problem has
persisted and grown with the size of the program.
The second part of this report provides an analytical dissection of the funding formulas over the life of
the MPCP, to help estimate and understand the allocation of the MPCP’s net impact among the various
classes of taxpayers. This analysis explains why the funding formula changes adopted thus far have not
eliminated the problem. Concluding remarks suggest possible lessons from the MPCP funding history.

Previous Analyses of the MPCP Fiscal Impact
Debates over the fiscal impact of the MPCP have gone through various phases over the program’s history.3
Initially, the public and scholarly debates focused on the size of the voucher and/or MPCP school
expenditures, compared to per pupil expenditures in MPS. At issue here was the relative efficiency of the
private and public schools.
Although it is possible to compare per pupil expenditures, the relative efficiency ultimately rests on the
educational results that different schools obtain from their expenditures. This report does not consider
educational results – that is the subject of the SCDP’s longitudinal analysis of MPCP performance.
Instead, this report considers the separate question of the impact on taxpayers of the MPCP, independent
of the educational results, so it cannot and does not address the issue of relative efficiency.
The most important work to date on the impact of the MPCP on taxpayers has been undertaken by the
Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau (LFB). The LFB is statutorily charged with providing information
to legislators on budget matters, including school funding formulas.4 Specifically, LFB has conducted
periodic analyses, at the request of legislators and other public officials, of the fiscal impact of the MPCP

3

See Appendix A for a selected review of this literature.

4

It regularly produces information papers on these formulas (timed to the biennial budget), cited below.
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on taxpayers, in and outside of Milwaukee.5 The question addressed by the LFB analyses is closely
related, but not identical to the question asked in this report. Instead of asking “what is the fiscal impact
compared to likely scenarios had the MPCP never existed,” the LFB analyses respond to queries about the
likely impact “if the program were eliminated.”
The LFB analyses imply that for each voucher student who would otherwise enroll in MPS, the public
funds spent on the voucher are less than the funds that would otherwise be spent from property taxes and
state taxes. Consequently, if all the MPCP students would otherwise attend MPS, the net fiscal impact of
eliminating the MPCP on state and local public funds taken together would be adverse. For FY07, the
impact implied by LFB estimates would have been $54.1 million.
LFB also analyzes the impact under the assumptions that 75%, 50%, 25% or 0% of MPCP students would
otherwise attend MPS if the program were eliminated. Under the 75% assumption, the net adverse
impact is smaller ($12.9 million), and for the assumptions of 50% or less, the net impact is estimated to be
a public saving.
The LFB analyses also show that the allocation of the net impact is very uneven. Under all scenarios, the
MPS levy would decline with the elimination of the voucher program, and under most scenarios the levies
in the rest of the state (taken together) would rise.6
In general contours, the findings of this report are consistent with LFB’s analyses, despite some minor
differences in methodology. Later sections of this report will include a comparison. This report’s main
contribution is to provide a detailed analysis of how Wisconsin’s funding formulas came to spread the
potential savings from the MPCP so unevenly among the state’s taxpayers.

MPCP Voucher and Expenditures vs. MPS Revenues and Expenditures
The basic data on which all analyses of the MPCP’s fiscal impact rest are the size of the voucher and one
measure or another of MPS per pupil expenditures or revenues. Figure 1 depicts the voucher and various
such measures for the MPS. The period depicted begins with the initial year of the MPCP, FY91.
The maximum voucher began at $2,446 and rose steadily to $6,501 in FY07, which is unchanged in FY08,
as shown with the solid red line.7 If a voucher school’s per pupil operating and debt service expenditures

5

Among these analyses are those dated September 27, 2001 for Representative Antonio Riley, January 21, 2005 for
Representative John Gard, January 23, 2006 for Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett, and January 14, 2008 for Representative
Michael Huebsch.

6

The size of these impacts depends on whether it is assumed that the general fund appropriation for MPCP would be
redirected to general school aids, since that feeds back through the state funding formulas to local property tax relief.
LFB provides estimates under both assumptions.

7

Prior to FY00, the maximum voucher was equal to the per pupil equalization aid for Milwaukee. From FY00-FY03, the
voucher was set at the previous year’s value, incremented by the change in the per pupil revenue limit (determined
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are lower, then the voucher is restricted to that. The red dotted line depicts the average voucher, reflecting
that restriction, for the years those data are available on-line. Since this is within a few percent of the
maximum voucher, and these data are only available with a lag, the remainder of this report will refer only
to the maximum voucher. Finally, the dashed red line depicts the average MPCP operating and debt
service expenditures, based on audited reports.
Figure 1: MPCP Voucher & Expenditures vs. MPS Revenues & Expenditures
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The per pupil expenditure figures for MPS are depicted with the green lines. The total expenditure per
pupil rose from $6,222 in FY91 to $11,885 in FY06 (the most recent year available), depicted with the
dotted-and-dashed line.8 These figures include capital and other expenditures as well as instructional and
support expenditures. Since FY00, Wisconsin’s Department of Public Instruction (DPI) has calculated
a measure of current expenditure, which “attempts to identify overall instructional and instructional
support service costs” by excluding transportation, capital and debt service, and food and community

statewide, as discussed below). Since FY04, the voucher has been set at the previous year’s value, incremented by the
statewide percent change in general school aid.
8

The specific series depicted is “Complete Annual School Cost” (CASC) per member from FY91-FY99, and “Total District
Cost” (TDC) per member from FY00-FY06, since the DPI switched measures in FY00. In general, these are not strictly
comparable before and after FY00 (as indicated by the dotted vs. dashed portion of the line), but for Milwaukee, the
data do not exhibit a large discontinuity in that year.
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service expenditures. This measure of current expenditure rose from $7,808 in FY00 to $10,332 in FY06,
depicted with the solid green line. Thus, MPS current expenditures per pupil have exceeded MPCP
operating and debt service expenditures (the dashed red line) by an amount rising from about $2,700 in
FY00 to about $3,500 in FY06.
We now turn to two MPS revenue measures, depicted with the blue lines. Since FY00, DPI has
calculated a figure for total revenue per pupil, a figure which includes Federal, state, property tax, and
other local revenues. It has risen from $9,227 in FY00 to $12,385 in FY06, as depicted with the dashed
blue line. This figure is now almost double the MPCP voucher, in part because it includes revenues
available for capital and other non-comparable expenditures, but also because it includes Federal and other
revenue sources not available for the MPCP.
The final measure depicted is the MPS per pupil revenue limit. As discussed in more detail in subsequent
sections of this report, the revenue limit covers the main source of state aid to MPS and MPS property
taxes. It does not include Federal revenues, as well as some other revenues, notably categorical state aid
for special education and low-income students. For the purposes of analyzing the impact of the MPCP
on state and local taxpayers in Wisconsin, this is more appropriate than the previously discussed measures,
and it is the measure that will be used in the remainder of this report. It has risen steadily from $5,804
in FY94 (the year Wisconsin established revenue limits) to $8,833 in FY07 and $9,141 for FY08,9 as
depicted by the solid blue line. The difference between the MPS revenue limit and the MPCP voucher
was generally around $2,000 from FY97-03, but has drifted up over the last few years to $2,332 in FY07
and $2,640 in FY08.10
This difference between the MPS revenue limit and the MPCP voucher is key to the analysis below, since
it represents the potential taxpayer savings for each student in the MPCP who would otherwise attend
MPS. The LFB analyses imply a larger estimate of this potential savings. The magnitude of the savings
for each such voucher student has not been featured in public discussions of the LFB analysis, but it can
be readily calculated from the data in the LFB tables.
In its most recent analysis ( January 14, 2008), for FY07, the LFB estimates that if all 17,000 voucher
students returned to MPS, the revenue limit would rise by $164.6 million (when fully phased in). This
represents an effect of $9,682 for each student, which is $850 higher than the MPS revenue limit.11 This
implies a savings from each MPCP student of $3,181 instead of the $2,332 figure given above. Similar

9

DPI’s October 23, 2007 estimate.

10

In percentage terms, the voucher has fluctuated in a narrow band, 71-74% of MPS’ revenue limit since FY98.

11

LFB’s calculations under the alternative assumptions of 75%, 50% and 25% enrollment of MPCP students in MPS all give
the same estimate for per pupil impact on revenue limits as the 100% estimate given above. That is, the total impact on
revenue limits is linear in the number of students. This is also true for LFB’s FY06 and FY05 estimates (January 23, 2006
and January 21, 2005).
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estimates are implied by the LFB analyses for FY05 and FY06, as depicted in Figure 1, by the purple line
fragment. Thus, compared to LFB estimates, this report uses lower figures for potential taxpayer savings
from each MPCP student who would have otherwise attended MPS.12

Enrollment
The other variables needed to calculate the net fiscal impact of the voucher program are enrollment in
the MPCP and the number of voucher students who would have enrolled in the public schools. MPCP
enrollments are depicted in Figure 2. Notable points on the diagram include the program’s expansion
to religious schools in FY99, and the expansion of the program’s cap in FY07. In all, after modest
beginnings over the first eight years of the program, MPCP enrollments have expanded over the last
decade from about 1,500 in FY98 to about 17,000 in FY07 and an estimated 18,500 in FY08.13
Figure 2: MPCP Enrollment, FY91-08
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In communications with LFB it was determined that the main difference is in the timing of the simulated phase-in.
The state’s revenue limit formula uses a three-year rolling average of enrollments. This report assumes the phase-in
is completed by the year in question, as is appropriate for an analysis of the scenario where MPCP had never existed.
Since LFB is examining a different scenario, the elimination of MPCP, the phase-in begins in the year in question and is
not completed until three years later. This accounts for the vast majority of the difference in the two estimates.

13

These are in full-time equivalents (FTE’s), the measure used for MPCP funding. FTE’s are a bit lower than headcounts,
since four-year-old kindergarteners and summer school students count as less than one FTE.
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We now need to estimate the number of MPCP students who would have attended public schools, had
the MPCP never existed. There are a few kinds of evidence to consider. By way of comparison, national
survey data indicate the percentage of all children from low-income families who attend private schools is
about 5%.14
A better estimate can be derived from research conducted on other voucher programs, with random
assignment. These programs, like Milwaukee’s, are limited to low-income families – families that would
find it difficult to pay tuition without a voucher for a sustained number of years. The studies give the
percent attending private schools among those who lose the lottery, for comparison with those who win.
The research literature here is thin, but indicates a possible rate of 10-15% who would still attend private
schools without the voucher after one year, dropping to under 5% by year three.15 A midrange estimate
from this literature, 10%, is the main one used in this report.
In evaluating this estimate, or any other one, it is important to consider the trends that were underway in
Milwaukee private schooling when the MPCP began. Enrollments were declining, particularly among
Catholic schools. John Witte traces the decline in private enrollments to the late ‘60s, interrupted by
a short-term increase beginning in 1978, due to involuntary busing.16 In 1987, a group of Milwaukee
business leaders under the auspices of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee organized to address the decline in
the Catholic schools. Later known as Partners Advancing Values in Education (PAVE), the group began
offering scholarships for low-income children during the early years of the MPCP, when that program
was restricted to non-sectarian schools. These scholarships grew in anticipation of the expansion of the
MPCP to religious schools. When the court ruling allowed that expansion to occur, PAVE scholarships
were cut back.17
Figure 3 depicts enrollment in Milwaukee’s private schools. Specifically, the top curve (blue) represents
total private enrollment data from DPI, a curve that continued to decline prior to the MPCP expansion,

14

The figure is 4.1% for household income under $25,000 in 2003, and 8.2% for income in the range of $25,000-$50,000.
(National Household Educational Survey, Parent and Family Involvement in Education, 2003, NCES) The MPCP eligibility
requirement is 175% of poverty threshold, which in 2003 would have been $32,918 for a household of four.

15

For example, in the Federally funded DC voucher experiment, after one year 80% of winners attended private school
and 11% of losers, which translates into an estimate of 14% (11/80) of voucher-users who would have attended private
schools anyway. Corresponding estimates among three relatively small privately-funded voucher programs (NYC,
Ohio, DC) range from 5% to 23%, with a weighted average of 11%. After a second year, the average drops to 9%, and
after a third year it drops to 4%. See Patrick Wolf, Babette Gutmann, Michael Puma, Lou Rizzo, Nada Eissa, and Marsha
Silverberg. Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Impacts After One Year. U.S. Department of Education,
Institute of Education Sciences. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007, NCEE 2007-4009, pp. 36-38,
and William G. Howell and Paul E. Peterson, with Patrick J. Wolf and David E. Campbell, The Education Gap: Vouchers and
Urban Schools, revised edition, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2002, p. 45.

16

John F. Witte, The Market Approach to Education, Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 40-41.

17

Paul E. Peterson, with Nathan Torinus and Brad Smith, “School Choice in Milwaukee Fifteen Years Later,” in Paul T. Hill, ed.,
Charter Schools Against the Odds: An Assessment of the Koret Task Force on K-12 Education, Hoover Press, 2006, p. 79.
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and has risen since then. The other two curves net out, respectively, MPCP enrollments and PAVE
scholarships as well.18 Since many of the PAVE scholarships prior to the MPCP’s expansion were
intended to facilitate that expansion, it may be helpful to net them out to get a better idea of the timing
in the underlying trends. Specifically, the purple and red curves depict the hypothetical trends in
private enrollments, if none of the MPCP students would have otherwise attended private schools, with
or without the PAVE students. These data suggest that the trend on these curves after the MPCP’s
expansion (FY99) was consistent with the trend prior to expansion. However, the DPI data are not
readily available prior to FY93, so these data cannot be directly compared with earlier trends, before the
CONFIDENTIAL EMBARGOED DRAFT
MPCP began.
Figure 3. Milwaukee Non-Public Enrollment, FY93-08
(September headcount)
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To go back earlier in time, Professor John Witte provided a longer series of private enrollments in
36
Milwaukee, from FY60-FY97. These data are from a different source and with a slightly different
definition, but the series can be spliced together with the more recent DPI data, by considering differences

18

The PAVE data depicted on the dotted portion of the curve (after PAVE shrunk in FY99) are the author’s estimates, based
on financial reports.
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relative to FY93.19 Taking both series and netting out the MPCP and PAVE figures, we have
the baseline curve (solid) depicted in Figure 4.20 As discussed above, Witte found that private
enrollments showed a long-term decline, temporarily interrupted by the busing experience, but resuming
its downward path prior to the MPCP. The data depicted here suggest that the baseline trend after
the MPCP is consistent with these long-term trends. Figure 4 also shows trends under alternative
assumptions on the percentage of the MPCP and PAVE students who otherwise would still have
attended private schools. The 10% assumption drawn from the voucher lottery literature yields a curve
that is similarly consistent with the long-term trends. Higher percentages, also depicted, would imply a
significant slowdown or even a reversal of the downward trends.

Figure 4: Milwaukee Private Enrollment Trends, FY60-08
(excluding MPCP and PAVE. Alternative percentages staying in private.)
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19

These data appear in Witte (2000), Figure 3.4, p. 42. For the period from FY80, the Witte data are those gathered by MPS
pursuant to Wisconsin law that requires an annual child census. The features of that census result in higher figures for
private education among Milwaukee families than the DPI figures on Milwaukee private schools. The census data have
also been affected by significant changes in methodology in recent years, so when DPI data are available, they appear to
be preferable. However, the trends in these data are what is important, and they are comparable between data sets.

20

Excluding MPCP only (leaving in PAVE) results in a similar curve, with similar long-term trends, but with the difference in
FY99 as depicted in Figure 3, when the PAVE scholarships were cut back with the expansion of MPCP.
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Of course, we have no way of knowing for sure whether the pre-MPCP trends would have continued,
slowed, or reversed. They could even have accelerated, if, for example, the decline in demand for private
schools led to further school closings instead of just more empty seats. No two cities are strictly
comparable, but Chicago may provide an illustrative example of a case where the decline in urban private
education seems to have accelerated during this period, in the absence of a large-scale voucher program.
Figure 5, based on data from the U.S. Department of Education, indicates that Chicago’s private
enrollments showed no trend from FY90-96, but then dropped 29% from FY96-06 (the most recent year
available).21

Figure 5: Enrollment Trends in Chicago, FY90-06
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To summarize, the estimate drawn from voucher lottery studies, that 10% of voucher students would
have attended private schools had the MPCP not existed, is consistent with private enrollment trends
in Milwaukee and elsewhere. Other estimates may also be consistent, and net impact estimates will be
provided below under alternative assumptions. Some estimates, however, may be safely ruled out, if they
imply non-credible alternative trends in private enrollments.22

21

These data are from the Private Schools Universe Survey (PSS) conducted every two years since FY90 by the U.S.
Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).

22

Other pieces of evidence were considered. For example, during part of the MPCP program, data were collected on
prior year attendance. In general, the program was not open to students already in private schools, but in FY99, the
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Finally, a distinction exists between the assumption that 90% would have attended public schools and that
90% would have attended MPS. It may well be the case that a significant portion would have attended
other public schools in Wisconsin, either by relocation or through Wisconsin’s inter-district transfer
program, or through charter school enrollments. As will be shown below, however, this would have only a
minor effect on the analysis of the fiscal impact of the MPCP.

Potential Taxpayer Gains from the MPCP
The difference between the state and local revenues allocated to a student in public school and the MPCP
voucher represents the potential taxpayer gains from each student who chooses to switch from public
schools to the MPCP. If all voucher students would otherwise have attended public schools, then the
total potential gains to the taxpayers simply equals the number of voucher students multiplied by the per
pupil difference between the revenue limit and the voucher. However, for any voucher student who would
have attended a private school anyway, the cost of the voucher is a net drain on public funds, offsetting
the gains from those who switch. The net gain (or loss) depends on the percent of such voucher students,
discussed in the previous section.
Specifically, the basic equation is:

Net Impact =
(public revenue/pupil × reduction in public enrollment)
- (voucher × MPCP enrollment)

year the Wisconsin court ruled that the MPCP could expand to include religious schools, private students in grades
K-3 were allowed to enter. In that year the DPI estimated there were about 4500 first-time MPCP enrollees, of whom
2300 had been K-3 private students, 1400 came from MPS and 800 had either just started school or were of unknown
prior status (March 22, 1999 Memorandum from Charlie Toulmin, Administrator of MPCP, to John R. Kalwitz, President
City of Milwaukee Common Council, on Financial Impact of MPCP). There are a number of difficulties in trying to infer
from these data an estimate of the steady state number of non-switching voucher students, but the main problem is
that the 2,300 K-3 non-switchers were almost all enrolled in these schools under privately-funded scholarships created
in anticipation of a favorable court ruling on the program expansion (Peterson (2006), p. 79; Sammis B. White, Peter
Maier, John Stott and Christine Cramer, “PAVE’s Annual Report on Research: Fifth Year,” Center for Urban Initiatives at the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1998, p. 5; Communication from Dan McKinley, President and CEO PAVE, January 5,
2008.) For a different view of the FY99 expansion and also the FY07 expansion, see Public Policy Forum, “Research Brief,”
Volume 95, No. 1, February 2007.
Another figure that was considered is found in the SCDP Baseline Report for the MPCP Longitudinal Educational
Growth Study (LEGS), issued simultaneously with this report. The LEGS report includes a Parental Survey that gauges
satisfaction with the MPCP and MPS. One question found that “51 percent of MPCP parents said that they would enroll
their child in a private school next year and pay tuition if a school voucher was no longer available.” This might or might
not be an accurate prediction of the one-year behavior upon elimination of the MPCP, given that students are already in
these schools, but it does not address the likely long-term impact of eliminating the MPCP or the likely path that would
have obtained had the MPCP never existed – the question addressed by this study.
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The figures for the voucher and the MPCP enrollment are known, but, as we have seen, there have been
different figures used for the per pupil effect of the MPCP on public revenues, and of course the reduction
in public enrollment is subject to estimate. Table 1 presents the estimated net impact for FY07 under
varying assumptions. The two columns correspond to the per pupil impact on MPS revenues, as implied
by the LFB estimate ($9,682) and using the FY07 MPS revenue limit ($8,833), respectively. The rows
correspond to different assumptions regarding the percent of MPCP students that would have attended
MPS, had the MPCP never existed.
Table 1. Net Impact of MPCP on Public Funds, FY07 ($ millions)
17,000 MPCP enrollees. Voucher = $6,501

Per Pupil Impact on MPS Revenues
% of MPCP students
that would have
attended MPS

100%
90%
80%
70%

$9,682 (LFB)

$8,833 (DPI)

$37.6 M

$24.6 M

$54.1 M
$21.2 M
$4.7 M

Positive Numbers Indicate Net Savings of Public Funds

$39.6 M
$9.6 M

- $5.4 M

The estimated net impact is somewhat sensitive to assumptions, ranging from a high of $54.1
million to negative $5.4 million. 23 For most likely scenarios the net impact is positive, i.e. taxpayer

savings. The figure of $24.6 million is based on the FY07 MPS revenue limit and the assumption that
90% of MPCP enrollees would have otherwise attended MPS (as discussed in the previous section).
The 90% assumption can be more broadly construed as the percent of MPCP enrollees who would have
attended public schools, either MPS or some other school as discussed above, without any major effect
on the estimate of net impact. For example, if we assume that 70% would have attended MPS and 20%
would have attended other public schools, and if we take the state’s average revenue limit ($9,149 in
FY07) for the other public schools, then the net impact would be $25.7 million instead of $24.6 million, a
minor difference.
Figure 6 presents the estimated net impact over the life of the program, using the MPS revenue limit and
the 90% assumption. Prior to the program’s expansion in FY99, the net gains were under $2.4 million,
but as the program’s enrollment grew the net impact grew to an estimated $24.6 million in FY07 and
$31.9 million in FY08.

23

The break-even point in the right-hand column is where 73.6% of voucher-users are non-switchers, the ratio of the
voucher to per pupil revenues, $6,501/$8,833.
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Figure 6: Potential Taxpayer Gains from the MPCP
(assumption: 90% of voucher students would otherwise have enrolled in MPS)
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We now turn, in the remainder of this report, to the question of how these potential gains are allocated
among various groups of taxpayers. This requires a close examination of Wisconsin’s funding formulas,
both for school districts and for the MPCP.

The General (non-MPCP) Wisconsin School Funding Formulas24
Wisconsin has two interlocked formulas that drive regular school funding – the revenue limit and
equalization aid formulas. The first key feature of this system is that a district’s available revenues rise
and fall with enrollment – the system is enrollment-sensitive in the long run. The second key feature is
that the state provides a portion of each district’s “shared costs” according to property values, while the
rest is provided by the local levy. The third key feature is that the aid formula automatically adjusts to
exhaust the state appropriation, with corresponding adjustments to local property taxes across the state.
This means that any funds freed up by enrollment shifts from high-spending to low-spending districts
automatically generate property tax relief shared across the state.

24

See “State Financing of K-12 Education in Wisconsin: Overview” September 26, 2007, Legislative Fiscal Bureau, www.
legis.state.wi.us/fb.
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To get a bit more analytical, Wisconsin’s school funding formulas are driven by three key variables for each
of the state’s 425 school districts – per pupil revenues, enrollment, and per pupil property values – together
with the total school aid appropriation of the state legislature. The basic structure is as follows:
(1) Each district’s per pupil revenues, from state and local sources together, is set at the previous year’s
level, plus a state-specified increment.
(2) Multiplying the specified per pupil revenue by district enrollment yields the total revenue (state
plus local) permitted for each district.
(3) Summing across districts, the statewide revenue limit is split between statewide school aid,
determined by the legislature, and local property taxes.
(4) Within the overall split, the split for each district is determined by a formula based on per pupil
spending and per pupil property values.
The long run response of a shift in enrollment from one district to another, holding everything else
constant, is that state aid is reallocated by the full amount of per pupil spending.25 That is, although
districts vary widely in their average state aid per student (since property wealth varies), their marginal
state aid per student is essentially 100% of per pupil revenues. To a first approximation, therefore, nothing
else changes upon a shift in enrollment: there is no effect on per pupil spending in either the sending
or receiving district, nor is there any effect on property taxation in either district. If enrollment shifts
between districts with different per pupil expenditures, the impact on total spending is automatically
absorbed by a change in property taxes, spread across the state.
In the more detailed discussion that follows (and in Appendix B), there will be modifications to the
simplified version presented above. However, this basic structure will provide the framework from which
to evaluate the fiscal impact of the MPCP in the sections to follow. We now turn to a more formal
analysis of the two main formulas that drive the funding system: Revenue Limits and Equalization Aid.

25

This response is phased in over a three-year period, because the enrollment measure that drives the revenue limit
formula is a three-year rolling average (see further discussion in Appendix B). The term “long run” here, and throughout
the text, is meant to remind the reader that the impact is not immediate.
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Revenue Limit26
Since 1993, Wisconsin’s Revenue Limit statute has set a maximum figure for each school district’s
revenues from state and local sources.27 Basically, the statute takes each district’s previous per pupil
revenues, increases it by an annual increment set in statute, and then multiplies that by enrollment to
determine the revenue limit.
For policy analysis below, it will be helpful to introduce a few simple equations. Formally, if we define piT
as the per pupil revenue limit in district i and year T and EiT as enrollment, the total revenue limit RiT is
determined by two equations:

Here, each district’s per pupil revenue increases over time from its base year level pi0 (the FY93 revenues
per pupil), by an annual statewide increment Δpt which is set in statute with annual inflation adjustments
(Δpt = $257 in FY07).28 For Milwaukee, the revenue limit was $8,833 per pupil in FY07; for the state’s
median district p was $9,085.29 For each district, the result is multiplied by enrollment to give the annual
revenue limit.
The key point here is that equation (1) is independent of shifts in enrollment: a district’s per pupil
revenue depends only on its base-year level, and a series of statewide increments.30 Consequently, the

26

See “Local Government Expenditure and Revenue Limits,” January 2007, Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau
Informational Paper 12. www.legis.state.wi.us/fb/Informationalpapers/12.pdf.

27

Some revenues are excluded from this limit, notably the various forms of categorical state aid, as well as local non-tax
revenues.

28

The determination of the annual increments has changed since 1993. Under current statute, dating to 1997, the annual
increments increase by inflation each year. This is not the same as increasing the per pupil revenue limit itself by
inflation. For example, if inflation is zero, the per pupil revenue limit will still increase by the previous year’s increment.
From FY98 to FY07, this method yielded a cumulative increase in per pupil revenue that exceeded the cumulative rate
of inflation (2.5% compounded) for the vast majority of districts (all those with per pupil revenue below $8,420 in FY98).

29

To reiterate, the revenue limit does not include such categorical aids as special education reimbursements and “SAGE”
grants (Student Achievement Guarantee in Education, for schools with high proportions of low-income pupils).
Milwaukee would tend to receive an above-average portion of these funds, as well as of Federal funds, which are also
not covered by revenue limits.

30

Unmodified, this system would freeze differentials in per pupil revenues among districts. However, there is also a
statewide minimum that is regularly raised to compress differentials ($8,400 in FY07; $8,700 in FY08; $9,000 in FY09).
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effect of any policy change on the district’s revenue limit works solely through enrollment, holding p
constant. If we consider a policy that shifts 10,000 students from one district to another over the period
from year 0 to year T, then the revenue limit in the sending district is reduced by 10,000 times that
district’s piT, while the revenue limit in the receiving district is raised by 10,000 times its pjT .

Equalization Aid and Local Levy31
We now examine how Wisconsin’s formulas split the funding of total revenue between state aid and
the local levy. Equalization aid is the state’s main form of school aid. It constitutes 98% of “General
School Aid” for the state as a whole and 93% for Milwaukee.32 The total amount of equalization aid is
determined by legislative appropriation,33 and the distribution of that total is governed by a formula based
primarily on district property values per pupil. Specifically, the distribution formula contains a parameter
that is calibrated each year to generate total equalization aid that exhausts the state appropriation. In this
way, the legislature’s appropriation decision effectively decides the aggregate split between state and local
school revenues, while property values apportion that split across districts.
The formula aims to equalize tax rates among districts with equal per pupil spending. It does so through
the concept of a state-guaranteed property tax base per pupil, such that differences in the property tax
base are offset by the aid formula.34 The aid formula can be daunting in appearance, and can easily be
misinterpreted, but with a bit of patience it can be correctly understood with regard to its central feature
for present purposes: the extent to which aid flows from one district to another as enrollment shifts.

This modification does not affect piT’s independence of enrollment. Another feature that induces a bit of district
variation in Δpt is discussed in Appendix B.
31

See “State Aid to School Districts,” January 2007, Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau Informational Paper 27,
www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/Informationalpapers/27.pdf.

32

General School Aid is the concept that enters the Revenue Limit, for determination of local levies. For more detail, see
Appendix B.

33

From FY97 to FY03, state law specified that two-thirds of statewide school revenues should be provided by the
state (including categorical aid, and also a school levy credit). Since FY03 the state share has been at the legislature’s
discretion, although the state’s implicit policy is to hew closely to the two-thirds rule.

34

Andrew Reschovsky has pointed out that the vast majority of equalization aid per pupil is distributed in a particularly
simple fashion, as the difference between a fixed spending figure (p2 discussed below) and a fixed tax rate on each
district’s per pupil property values. Only a small portion of spending – the portion exceeding p2 – is truly governed by
the guaranteed tax base formula. See Andrew Reschovsky, “Reforming Wisconsin’s School Funding Formula”, November
28, 2007, State Capitol, Madison.
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The usual presentation calculates equalization aid, A, in three components, each of which is a share of the
corresponding “tier” of “shared costs.” “Shared costs” is similar to the concept used in revenue limits,35 and
we shall use the same notation, p∙E. (Here and below, we suppress subscripts i and t, for district and time,
except where needed.)
Shared costs are broken down into three tiers p1∙E, (p2-p1)∙E, and (p-p2)∙E. By statute, p1 is set at $1,000
and p2 is set at 90% of the prior year’s statewide average for shared cost per pupil (p2 = $8,251 in FY07).
The local levy’s share of each tier of spending is v/vh, where v is the district’s property values per pupil
(prior year), while v1, v2, and v3, are cutoff points for guaranteed property values per pupil. This means the
state shares of these tiers are (1-v/vh), h=1,2,3.36 Putting this all together, the equation for state aid is:

The parameter v1 is set by statute at $1,930,000 (since FY03) and v3 is set at the prior year’s statewide
average of property values per pupil ($483,015 for use in FY07). The remaining parameter, v2, is not set
in statute, but varies with the legislative decision on total appropriation – the value of this parameter is set
to exhaust the appropriation on the aid determined by the formula ($1,292,558 in FY07).

When the formula is built up in this fashion, it can lead one to conclude that aid is proportional to
enrollment, so that when enrollment shifts, aid shifts by the aid per pupil. However, this is incorrect. The
reason is that v, property values per pupil, also changes with enrollment. To see this, write v = V/E, where
V is total property values, and then simplify (3):

The expression now shows that to a first approximation (holding v2 constant for the moment) a district’s
equalization aid varies with enrollment by the full per pupil spending, p, rather than just the per pupil aid.
That is, under the Wisconsin formula, ΔA/ΔE = p > A/E: the marginal aid exceeds the average aid per
pupil.

35

See Appendix B for discussion of differences.

36

The state shares can be negative at one or more tiers. However, there is a state hold harmless guaranteeing that each
district will at least receive the primary tier aid. There is also a hold harmless that primary tier aid is non-negative.
These hold harmless provisions have not affected Milwaukee.
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Now turn to the local levy, which is that portion of shared cost not provided by the state. It is given in
the second term above:37

Finally, note that v2 is determined by the requirement that district aid allotments, Ai, exhaust the state
appropriation, S:

The equations above are intended to capture the essence of the funding formulas that are central to
policy analysis. 38 Omitted details are certainly important to district fiscal authorities managing their
yearly budgets, but their inclusion above would impede understanding of the logic of the policy impacts.
Appendix B discusses a number of these details and why their omission does not have a material effect on
our analysis.

The Fiscal Impact of Enrollment Shifts
Consider a shift of enrollment, ΔE, from district j to district k. Suppose further that pj > pk: enrollment
shifts from a higher-spending to lower-spending district. Then revenue limits go down in district j
and up, but by a smaller amount, in district k. The direct effect of this shift is to move aid from district
j to k by the full amount of the change in the revenue limits. This leaves some aid left over, (pj - pk)∙ΔE,
to spread across all districts. The aid formula accomplishes this by raising v2, changing the overall
split between levies and aid. Specifically, it can be shown that each district’s levy drops by a portion of

37

A portion of the levy is defrayed by the state, under the School Levy Tax Credit. The amount of the credit is
determined legislatively and apportioned among the municipalities, prior to sending out property tax bills. In 2006, an
appropriation of $593 M reduced school property taxes by an average of 15.2%.

38

There are a few other features of (4)-(5) that bear observation. Equation (5) shows the specified tax rate, L/V, equals the
parenthesized term. Every element of that term is the same across districts, except p, so the tax rate is equalized across
all districts with equal per pupil revenues. Districts with higher p will have higher specified tax rates. (A complication
is introduced by the hold harmless provisions, omitted from (4)-(5). These provisions reduce the specified tax rate for
districts with particularly high property values.) On the aid side, equation (4) can be used to show that for districts with
the same property values per pupil, the one with higher p will have higher aid per pupil, if the property value per pupil
is below the state average (v < v3), and lower aid per pupil if property values exceed the state average (v > v3).

The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008

February 2008

the aid that is freed up, (pj - pk)∙ΔE, and its share of that is equal to its share of total property values.39
Consequently, each district’s aid is adjusted upward by that amount, on top of the original change in aid
from the change in the revenue limit.
For example, suppose 17,000 students shifted out of Milwaukee, with pM=$8,833 (the figure for FY07)
to some other district with px=$6,501. The results are summarized in Table 2. Milwaukee’s revenue limit
would decline by $8,833 × 17,000 = $150.2 M and the other district’s revenue limit would rise by $6,501
× 17,000 = $110.5 M. As a first pass, aid would change by the same amounts. However, this would free
up $39.6 M of aid. If the appropriation is unchanged, that $39.6 M is spread across districts in the form
of reduced levies and correspondingly higher aid.
Table 2: Fiscal Impact of 17,000 student shift from Milwaukee to District X
assumptions: pM=$8,833, px=$6,501
State Aid

Milwaukee

- $147.7 M

District X

All Other Districts

TOTAL

+ $110.5 M
+ $37.2 M

$0

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:
Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:

Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:
Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:

Local Levy

- $2.4 M

TOTAL

- $150.2 M

$0

+ $110.5 M

- $39.6 M

- $39.6 M

- $37.2 M

$0

-$2,332 x 17,000 = - $39.6 M
$0

$0

+ $2.4 M

+ $37.2 M

Milwaukee’s share of the $39.6 M would be 6.1% of the total, $2.4 M, since its property values comprise
6.1% of the state’s total. Consequently, Milwaukee’s levies would drop by $2.4 M and its drop in aid
would thus be mitigated to $147.7 M = $150.2 M - $2.4 M. Suppose the district receiving these 17,000
students has a negligible share of the state’s property values, so its levies would remain unchanged and its
aid would rise by the full $110.5 M rise in the revenue limit. For all other districts taken together, local
levies would drop by $37.2 M = $39.6 M - $2.4 M, and aid would rise by the same amount.

39

The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008

23

24

February 2008

To summarize: there is no impact on per pupil revenues for students who remain in their districts, and
spending is reduced on those students who shift districts. The result is a saving to taxpayers. Since the
state appropriation is unchanged, there is no impact on state taxpayers: the savings are all passed on to
local taxpayers, spread across the state. These impacts, summarized in the bottom of Table 2, must sum
to zero.

Fiscal Impact of a Voucher System Under General
(non-MPCP) Funding Formulas
Suppose now that District X, above, is not a public school district, but is, instead, the set of private
schools that accept vouchers, of $6,501 (the FY07 MPCP voucher). This virtual district has no residents,
property values, or levy. Instead of aid, it receives vouchers, funded by the state. If all 17,000 voucher
students would have otherwise attended MPS, then the fiscal impacts would be the same as above. The
net benefit of $39.6 M (depicted earlier in Table 1) is spread among property taxpayers in Milwaukee and
across the state.
Now consider our assumption that only 90% of the 17,000 voucher students would have attended MPS,
and 10% would have attended private schools anyway. As we saw in Table 1, the net benefits to taxpayers
are reduced to $24.6 M for FY07. Table 3 provides detail.40 The smaller net benefit is represented by
the smaller effect on Milwaukee’s revenue limit ($135.1 million vs. $150.2 million in Table 2). The
allocation of the net benefit is in the local levy column, as before, with corresponding effects on the state
aid column. The bottom half of Table 3 introduces a new party to the fiscal impact analysis – parents of
voucher students who would have attended private school anyway. These parents receive about a third of
the savings from the reduced expenditures on students who leave MPS, and the other two-thirds goes to
taxpayers. Figure 7 extends these results back to FY94 and forward to FY08, to show how the potential
gains depicted in Figure 6 could have been allocated under the general funding formulas.41

40

The equations underlying Table 3 and Figure 7 below are provided in Appendix C, along with equations for other tables
and figures below.

41

This assumes Milwaukee’s share of property values is unchanged.
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Table 3: Fiscal Impact of 17,000 student voucher program under General Formula
assumptions: as in Table 2, but only 90% voucher students from MPS.
State Aid/Vouchers

Milwaukee

Voucher Schools

All Other Districts

- $ 133.6 M

Local Levy

- $1.5 M

+ $110.5 M
+ $23.1 M

TOTAL

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:

- $135.1 M

$0

+ $110.5 M

- $24.6 M

- $24.6 M

- $23.1 M

$0

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:

TOTAL

$0

-$2,332 x 17,000 x 0.90 = - $35.7 M

Fiscal Impact on Parents of Non-Switching Voucher Students:
Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:

Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:

$0

+ $11.1 M
$0

+ $1.5 M

Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:

+ $23.1 M

Figure 7: Allocation of the Net Voucher Impact Under General Aid and Revenue Formulas
(assumptions: 90% voucher students from MPS; total of aid + voucher expenditures held constant)
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In Table 3 and Figure 7, it was assumed that the total state appropriation for aid and vouchers together
is unchanged from the aid-alone appropriation. That is, the state aid appropriation is reduced by the
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full amount of the vouchers ($110.5 M in FY07). It is difficult to assess the validity of this assumption
or any alternative assumption, since it depends on a counterfactual, “what would the appropriation have
been, absent the voucher program?” This is a political economy question, rather than one of strict fiscal
analysis. One might argue that, in principle, it should not matter to legislators whether the appropriation
for children in Milwaukee is directed to MPS or to voucher schools attended by students who would
otherwise attend MPS. If so, the total appropriation would be constant and the analyses above would be
correct.
Alternatively, suppose voucher expenditures “don’t count” politically, so the total aid appropriation does
not drop dollar-for-dollar when students leave for voucher schools. More specifically, suppose the aid
appropriation is determined by the 2/3 rule that was in statute for FY97-03, and has roughly guided
policy since then. That is, aid drops by 2/3 of the reduction in the Milwaukee revenue limit and property
taxes statewide drop by the other 1/3.42 If the cut in aid is less than the state’s voucher expenditures, then
there is an increase in the state tax burden (or a drain on other state expenditures). Table 4 depicts the
impact for FY07. The net difference from Table 3 is greater property tax relief across the state, funded by
state taxpayers. Figure 8 shows how the potential gains would have been allocated over time under this
alternative assumption regarding state appropriations.

Table 4: Fiscal Impact of 17,000 student voucher program under General Formula
assumptions: as in Table 3, but state aid drops by 2/3 drop in revenue limit
State Aid/Vouchers

Milwaukee

Voucher Schools

All Other Districts
TOTAL

- $132.4 M

Local Levy

- $2.7 M

+ $110.5 M
+ $42.3 M

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:

- $135.1 M

$0

+ $110.5 M

- $45.0 M

- $24.6 M

- $42.3 M

+ $20.4 M

TOTAL

$0

-$2,332 x 17,000 x 0.90 = - $35.7 M
$0

Fiscal Impact on Parents of Non-Switching Voucher Students:

+ $11.1 M

Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:

+ $2.7 M

Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:

Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:

42

- $20.4 M

+ $42.3 M

The 2/3 rule includes other funds besides general school aid and school property taxes, specifically categorical aid,
expenditures on residential schools and also the school levy credit. As a result, general school aid is less than 2/3 of the
sum of general school aid and school property taxes. However, it is still the case that the change in general school aid is
2/3 of the change in the sum of general school aid and school property tax (i.e. 2/3 of the change in the revenue limit).
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Figure 8: Allocation of the Net Voucher Impact Under General Aid and Revenue Formulas
(assumptions: 90% voucher students from MPS; state share of public education held constant at 2/3)
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To summarize:
(1) The voucher program frees up funds, since students are willing to accept a voucher of smaller size than
the per pupil revenues in MPS. Some of that is offset by the provision of vouchers to students who would
have attended private school anyway, but most plausible estimates indicate this is only a partial offset.
(2) The question addressed by the funding system is the disposition of freed-up funds.
(3) The regular Wisconsin funding formula is one where enrollment changes lead to corresponding shifts
in aid, and where the local levies adjust to ensure that aid exhausts the state appropriation. Had this
formula been used to fund the voucher program, the result would have been a reduction in local property
taxes, across the state.
(4) To the extent that the state would have chosen to increase the total appropriation (i.e. reducing aid by
less than the voucher amount), there would have been an adverse impact on state taxpayers, matched by
further reduction in local property taxes. The 2/3 rule would have typically had this effect, during most of
the MPCP history.
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Fiscal Impact of the Voucher System Under the
MPCP Funding Formulas43
The previous section analyzed the hypothetical fiscal impact of the MPCP vouchers, had they been
implemented under the state’s general formulas for revenue limits and equalization aid. This provides
a benchmark with which to compare the actual formulas used by Wisconsin to fund the MPCP. These
formulas have gone through a few distinct periods, with different mechanisms for allocating the potential
gains among the various parties. Throughout the history of the program, however, one constant has been
the very uneven fiscal impact. As the program has grown, it has become more important to understand
the nature of the funding formulas, how they have evolved in attempts to deal with uneven impacts, and
why those attempts have not fully succeeded.
Figure 9 summarizes the allocation of the MPCP’s net fiscal impact over the life of the program. Since
its inception, the MPCP has been funded in a fashion that has adversely impacted Milwaukee taxpayers,
but since FY00, it has benefited non-Milwaukee property taxpayers and state taxpayers. Figure 9 is
based on the 90% assumption discussed above, but the same general pattern holds for widely varying
assumptions on the percent of voucher students who would have attended MPS. 44
The analysis below explains how the funding mechanisms worked over each period and why they resulted
in the patterns depicted in Figure 9. The goal here is to understand why these patterns contrast so
markedly with the alternatives offered by the regular funding formula, depicted in Figures 7 and 8.

43

See Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Information Paper 29, “Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,” January 2007.

44

For example, the general pattern still holds even for the assumption of 70%, which, as Table 1 shows, implies a negative
net benefit. That is, under this assumption, there is still a sizeable net benefit for non-Milwaukee property taxpayers
and state taxpayers, but not as large as the adverse impact on Milwaukee. The various LFB reports also find the same
general pattern of benefits to non-Milwaukee property taxpayers and adverse effect on Milwaukee for a wide range of
the assumed percentage.
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Figure 9: Allocation of the Net Voucher Impact Under the MPCP Formula

(assumptions: 90% voucher students from MPS; state share of public education held constant at 2/3)

$100,000,000

$75,000,000

$50,000,000

$25,000,000

$0

-$25,000,000

-$50,000,000
FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08
Milwaukee property taxpayers

Other property taxpayers

State taxpayers

Milwaukee Public Schools

MPCP Funding Formula Prior to FY00
The key feature of the funding formula prior to FY00 was that voucher enrollees were counted as part
of MPS’ enrollment, for purposes of calculating both revenue limits and equalization aid. The voucher
amount was set equal to MPS’ average equalization aid per pupil and that amount was deducted from
MPS’ aid, to fund the vouchers. Finally, Milwaukee was allowed to replace the aid deduction by increases
to its local levy, “and to a great extent did so.”45
This was a simple system, but it had a striking implication. Even though the voucher was set below the
MPS per pupil revenue limit, which would have reduced total public funding of education under the
regular formula, that did not occur. Since Milwaukee was authorized to raise the local levy to offset the
aid deduction, the revenues available for MPS did not fall, despite the transfer of students and funds to
voucher schools. Thus, instead of reducing total public funding of education, this system increased it. The
fiscal impact was negative on taxpayers and positive on students remaining in MPS, by raising per pupil
spending.46

45

“MPCP Facts and Figures for 1998-1999,” Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction.

46

It might be argued that at the outset of MPCP the number of voucher students was small enough that MPS fixed costs
remained fixed, so per pupil costs rose. By FY99, however, the number of voucher students was 5,761, a number that
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Specifically, an enrollment shift from MPS to the voucher schools had no effect on the revenue limit,
since it included the voucher students during this period. Indeed, to the extent that some voucher
students would not have attended MPS anyway, the MPCP actually increased MPS’ revenue limit, since
it included all voucher students. Thus, Milwaukee not only received funding for students who were no
longer in their schools; it also received funding for at least a few students who would never have been in
MPS.
Table 5 presents the fiscal impact of the MPCP using FY99 data, assuming 90% of that year’s 5,761
voucher students would have otherwise attended MPS. The other 576 students were new to Milwaukee’s
enrollment figures, raising the revenue limit, and the state’s total by $6,852 per pupil (MPS’ per pupil
revenue limit), or $3.9 M. The main impact on local property taxes is the rise in Milwaukee’s levy to fund
the vouchers, $28.2 million. There was a slight additional effect, since one-third of the statewide rise in
revenue limits would have been funded by higher property taxes across the state.47 The other two-thirds
($2.6 million) would have come out of state funds, under the 2/3 rule.

Table 5: Fiscal Impact of 5,761 student voucher program under FY99 Formula
assumptions: pM=$6,852, px=$4,894. 90% voucher students from MPS.
State Aid/Vouchers

Milwaukee

Voucher Schools

All Other Districts
TOTAL

- $24.3 M

Local Levy

+ $28.3 M

+ $28.2 M
- $1.2 M

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:

+ $3.9 M

$0

+ $28.2 M

+ $29.5 M

+ $32.1 M

+ $1.2 M

+ $2.6 M

TOTAL

$0

-$1,958 x 5,761 x 0.90 = - $10.1 M

+ $39.5 M

Fiscal Impact on Parents of non-Switching Voucher Students:

+ $2.8 M

Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:

- $28.3 M

Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:

Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:

- $2.6 M

- $1.2 M

would seem to be large enough that many fixed costs become variable. Certainly the school level fixed costs for MPS
would not pertain since MPCP attained the size of a large district. Approximately 95 percent of all school districts in
Wisconsin have fewer students than MPCP did in FY99; only five districts, including Milwaukee, have more students than
MPCP has today.
47

During this period statute required the State Superintendent to ensure that no district’s aid (outside of Milwaukee)
was reduced as a result of the program. However, that would have required the state to estimate a counterfactual, the
number of private stayers. Presumably, the state met its legal requirement by interpreting the impact in such a way as
to exclude these effects.
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The bottom half of Table 5 summarizes the fiscal impacts. The net potential fiscal benefit was $7.3 million
(as depicted previously in Figure 6). This represents the $10.1 million in public funds potentially freed
up by educating children with lower-cost vouchers, offset by the $2.8 million paid to parents of voucher
students who it is assumed would have attended private schools anyway. However, these potential savings
were more than outweighed by the extra $39.5 M that was spent on the children who stayed in district.
This represents the $6,852 per pupil revenue provided to MPS for each of the 5,761 voucher students
who were not in MPS, thereby raising the per pupil expenditures on those who remained. These extra
expenditures (net of the potential savings) were funded primarily by higher Milwaukee property taxes,
with a smaller amount coming from other property taxes and state funds.
To summarize, the funding system prior to FY00 provided a completely different disposition of the funds
freed up by lower-cost vouchers than would have been provided by the regular funding system analyzed
earlier. Specifically:
(1) Instead of applying potential savings to reduced property taxes across the state, the system raised
property taxes in Milwaukee, and spent it, together with the savings from lower vouchers, on higher
per pupil spending for the remaining MPS students. These effects are seen in Figure 9 for the period
FY94-99. The positive impact on MPS per pupil spending is depicted by the green bars, and the adverse
impact on Milwaukee property taxes is depicted by the blue bars in the negative portion of the graph.
(2) In addition, to the extent that vouchers went to students who would have been in private school
anyway, this led to increased property taxes across the state and a greater demand on state tax revenues.
However, the amounts were relatively small, as depicted in Figure 9 by the slivers of maroon and tan over
the period FY94-99.

MPCP Funding FY00-FY01
In 1999, a major change was enacted: voucher enrollees would no longer be counted as part of MPS
enrollment. This was a major step toward integrating the voucher program into Wisconsin’s underlying
enrollment-sensitive funding formula. It eliminated the extra spending on students remaining in MPS.
However, vestiges of the previous formula remained, and other complications were added.
Specifically, the previous practice of deducting district aid to fund the vouchers persisted, but only half
the cost of the vouchers was deducted from MPS aid and the other half from the rest of the state’s
districts (proportionate to their aid). As before, any district’s aid deduction for MPCP could be offset
by an increase in the local levy, since the net aid is deducted from the revenue limit to determine the
allowed levy.
It is worth emphasizing here the overall significance of these changes before considering the other
complications below. Since voucher students were removed from MPS enrollment counts, the state no
longer provided MPS with aid for them. This was certainly a move toward rationalizing the funding
mechanism. However, the state continued to deduct voucher money from the remaining aid allocation.
To be sure, the deduction was cut in half, but the rationale behind any deduction would seem to have
disappeared with the removal of voucher students from the MPS aid determination in the first place.
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Finally, MPS was allowed to replace the aid deduction by raising the property tax, so the net result was to
perpetuate the adverse effect of the MPCP on Milwaukee taxpayers, albeit in attenuated form.
We also have to consider the two-thirds rule that was in effect. The exclusion of voucher students from
MPS enrollment counts reduced shared costs, so statewide property taxes would be reduced by one-third
of this amount and statewide aid would be reduced by two-thirds of it.48 However, for the purpose of
determining statewide shared costs, the local levy augmentation for MPCP was included.49 In effect,
this added the voucher costs to statewide shared costs so that under the 2/3 rule this would help offset
the reduction in the state’s total aid appropriation that would otherwise follow from excluding MPCP
enrollment counts from MPS
The net result is depicted in Table 6, for the FY01 values of the voucher amount, enrollment and per pupil
revenues for MPS. The key figure we continue to focus on is the reduction in public spending on voucher
students. In FY01, the saving on each of the voucher students who would have attended MPS (90% of
9,238) is $2,049 = $7,375 - $5,326, for a total of $17.0 M. This is partially offset by the $4.9 M that goes
to parents of voucher students who would have attended private schools anyway. Unlike the pre-FY00
system, all of these savings go to taxpayers, rather than extra spending on MPS students. This follows
from the exclusion of voucher students from Milwaukee’s revenue limit.
Table 6: Fiscal Impact of 9,238 student voucher program under FY01 Formula
pM=$7,375, voucher=$5,326. Assuming 90% of students from MPS.
State Aid/Vouchers

Milwaukee

Voucher Schools

($ 82.7 M)

All Other Districts

TOTAL

Local Levy

$21.4 M

$49.2 M

$0

$25.4 M

($25.4 M)

($8.1 M)

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:

($4.0 M)

Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:
Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:

($61.3 M)
$49.2 M

$0

($12.1 M)

-$2,049 x 9,238 x 0.90 = - $17.0 M

Fiscal Impact on Parents of Non-Switching Voucher Students:
Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:

TOTAL

$0

+ $4.9 M

+ $8.1 M

- $21.4 M

+ $25.4 M

The benefit to taxpayers is split between state and local according to the 2/3 rule. However, the 1/3
benefit for local taxpayers is allocated quite asymmetrically between Milwaukee and the rest of the state.

48

The LFB analysis of September 27, 2001, cited earlier, does not include the effect of the enrollment shift from MPS. As a
result, that analysis finds a net increase in state and local taxes, rather than a decrease.

49

This was a change from the pre-FY00 period.
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There are two effects here. First, the local levies for Milwaukee and the rest of the state each rise by one-half
the total voucher amount of $49.2 M. However, to restore the 1/3 local share for total revenues, the statewide
levies had to be reduced, and shifted to aid, by $53.2 M. But these gains are apportioned by the district’s share
of property values. Since Milwaukee has far less than one-half the state’s property values, this mitigated very
little of Milwaukee’s local taxpayer share of the voucher costs. The rest of the state (taken together) enjoyed a
net reduction in local taxes when all was said and done.

To summarize:
(1) The removal of voucher students from MPS revenue limits allowed the net savings from the voucher
program to go to taxpayers instead of the remaining MPS students, as in the pre-FY00 system. In Figure 9, the
green bars disappear. They are replaced by maroon and tan bars in the positive portion of the graph, representing
net benefits for state taxpayers and especially property taxpayers outside of Milwaukee.
(2) The shift of 50% of the MPCP aid reduction and levy offset away from MPS reduced the adverse effect
on Milwaukee property taxpayers, but that adverse effect persisted, as the program grew. The blue bars in the
negative portion of Figure 9 shrunk in FY00, but then continued to grow thereafter.

MPCP Funding FY02-FY03
In 2001, the statute dropped the MPCP aid deduction and levy offset for districts other than Milwaukee. It
also reduced Milwaukee’s deduction from 50% to 45% of the voucher costs (which could still be tacked onto the
levy). The other 55% of the voucher costs now came directly from the General Fund.
The 2/3 rule was still in effect, but the MPCP levy hike was no longer counted toward statewide shared costs.50
Thus, the fall in Milwaukee’s revenue limit, due to the enrollment shift, is the only effect of MPCP on the 2/3
rule calculation.
The main effects of these changes are on property taxpayers outside of Milwaukee and state taxpayers. The nonMilwaukee taxpayers lose the previous benefit of almost all the aid increase under the 2/3 rule for the voucher
expenses, and, in the aggregate, this outweighs the fact that they no longer pay half these expenses.51 Conversely,
the state taxpayers gain from not having to increase state aid by 2/3 of the voucher expenses, and this outweighs
the fact that they now have to pay 55% of them directly.
To summarize, the net effects of these changes were fairly modest, resulting in a small shift of benefits from
non-Milwaukee taxpayers to state taxpayers. This can be seen in Figure 9, where the maroon bar for nonMilwaukee property taxpayers shrinks in FY02, in favor of the tan bar for state taxpayers. Table 7 gives more
detail on the impact using FY03 figures.

50
51

For that reason, the new deduction of 45% was thought to be comparable to the old figure of 50%.
Of course, the elimination of the direct payment for MPCP was a quite visible benefit for non-Milwaukee taxpayers, compared
to the much less visible adverse impact of the change to the 2/3 rule.
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Table 7: Fiscal Impact of 11,231 student voucher program under FY03 Formula
pM=$7,776, voucher=$5,783. Assuming 90% of students from MPS
State Aid/Vouchers

Milwaukee

($ 106.2 M)

Voucher Schools

Local Levy

$27.6 M

$64.9 M

All Other Districts

$0

$24.6 M

TOTAL

($24.6 M)

($16.7 M)

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:

$3.0 M

TOTAL

($78.6 M)
$64.9 M

$0

($13.7 M)

-$1,993 x 11,231 x 0.90 = - $20.1 M
$0

Fiscal Impact on Parents of Non-Switching Voucher Students:

+ $6.5 M

Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:

-$27.6 M

Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:

Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:

$16.7 M

$24.6 M

MPCP Funding FY04-FY08
The 2/3 rule was dropped in 2003, restoring the legislature’s discretion to set the state appropriation.
However, as noted above, the 2/3 rule-of-thumb seems to have persisted as a non-binding guide to
policy. The state still regularly publishes the statistic, using the measure previously established in law.
For FY04-07, the calculated state share ranged from 63.7% to 66.3%. For the purposes of this analysis
of MPCP’s impact, we assume that in the absence of MPCP the state share would have been 2/3.52 As
Figure 9 shows, under this assumption, the patterns in FY04-07 were simply a continuation of prior
patterns, augmented by growth in the program.
Table 8 depicts the effects of MPCP in detail for FY07. The reduction in MPS’ revenue limit is $135.1
million, as calculated from the per pupil revenue limit of $8,833 for 90% of the 17,000 voucher students.
The voucher expenses are $110.5 million ($6,501 for each of the 17,000 students). This leaves a net
taxpayer benefit of $24.6 million. This benefit is generated by the savings of $35.7 million from those
students who forgo the MPS per pupil revenues in favor of the lower cost voucher, partially offset by the
$11.1 million spent on vouchers for those who would not have been in MPS.

52

An alternative assumption would have been to take the actual shares, but since these are so close to 2/3 (it was 66.1%
in FY07), the results would have been indistinguishable.
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The allocation of the $24.6 million net benefit among taxpayers is as follows. Since the statewide revenue
limit drops by $135.1 million, the state aid allocation drops by 2/3 of that, or $90.1 million. This is
partially offset by the state general fund’s 55% share of the voucher expenditures ($60.8 million), for a net
benefit to the state taxpayers of $29.3 million. The other 1/3 of the drop in statewide revenue limit, $45.0
million, goes to property tax relief, of which the vast majority ($42.3 million) accrues to those outside of
Milwaukee. Milwaukee’s share of this benefit ($2.7 million) is swamped by the MPCP levy hike, which
is 45% of the voucher expenditures, resulting in a net adverse impact on Milwaukee property taxpayers of
$47.0 million.
It may be informative to compare this with Table 4, which also considered the impact of MPCP under
the 2/3 rule, but otherwise run through the general formulas. To recall, instead of funding 55% of the
voucher from the general fund and 45% through Milwaukee, Table 4 considered the case where 100% was
run through the general fund. The difference between the two funding mechanisms is a pure shift of the
burden for 45% of the vouchers from the Milwaukee taxpayers to state taxpayers. One may also recall
the mechanism in Table 3, under which, again, the voucher was run through the general fund, but state aid
was reduced by the full amount of the voucher expenditures ($110.5 million in this case), instead of the
smaller amount ($90.1 million) under the 2/3 rule. As we saw, under that mechanism no set of taxpayers
was adversely affected by MPCP.
Table 8: Fiscal Impact of 17,000 student voucher program under FY07 Formula pM=$8,833,
voucher=$6,501. Assuming 90% of students from MPS & 2/3 policy.
State Aid/Vouchers

Milwaukee

Voucher Schools

($ 182.1 M)

All Other Districts

TOTAL

Local Levy

$47.0 M

$110.5 M

$0

$42.3 M

($42.3 M)

($29.3 M)

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Switch:

Fiscal Impact on Students Who Stay In District:

$4.7 M

Fiscal Impact on Milwaukee Property Taxpayers:
Fiscal Impact on Other Property Taxpayers:

($135.1 M)
$110.5 M
$0

($24.6 M)

-$2,332 x 17,000 x 0.90 = - $35.7 M

Fiscal Impact on Parents of Non-Switching Voucher Students:
Fiscal Impact on State Taxpayers:

TOTAL

$0

+ $11.1 M

+ $29.3 M
-$47.0 M

+$42.3 M

The issue of the “funding flaw” — the adverse impact on Milwaukee taxpayers — had been simmering for
years and made its way into the budget debate for FY08-09, with proposals by the Governor and the City
of Milwaukee. No formula reform was enacted in this cycle, however. Instead the problem was partially
addressed with something of an ad hoc fix, by which the state appropriated $9 M of “high poverty aid” in
FY08 and $12 M in FY09 to reduce the school property tax burden, primarily of Milwaukee. For FY08,
Milwaukee received $7.4 million of this aid, with corresponding property tax relief. This is seen in Figure
9, with the shrinkage of Milwaukee’s blue bar, and the corresponding shrinkage of the tan bar representing
state taxpayers’ benefit.
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Conclusions
The potential fiscal benefit of MPCP for Wisconsin taxpayers may be substantial, as families voluntarily
choose schools that draw on fewer public resources than are allocated per pupil to MPS. The difference
has risen from about $2,000, from FY97 to FY03, to over $2,600 in FY08. Coupled with the dramatic
growth in voucher enrollments, the potential savings may now exceed $30 million, as depicted in Figure
6. Categorical programs, excluded from this analysis, offer additional savings. For example, the SAGE
program offers conditional grants to Milwaukee (and other districts) of $2,000 per low income student
(rising to $2,250 in FY08), which are not included in the per pupil revenue limits used in this paper, and
which add to taxpayer savings when such students choose MPCP.
The allocation of these benefits among different classes of taxpayers has been a challenge for Wisconsin
over the years. In the early years, when the benefits were small, the allocation was not a major issue. It
seems that the course of least resistance was to fund the program out of MPS aid, and to ensure that MPS
revenues did not decline in those early days, even as voucher students left, Milwaukee taxpayers picked up
the tab. When the program expanded in FY99, however, the strains of this simple arrangement became
evident, as depicted in Figure 9.
A potentially appealing solution was available in the existing revenue and aid formulas, which are highly
enrollment-sensitive and thus compatible with the logic of choice. These formulas would allocate the
gains among property taxpayers in Milwaukee and across the state, as depicted in Figure 7. If additional
property tax relief was desired, these formulas also offered a ready solution, under which voucher
expenditures need not be offset dollar-for-dollar by aid cuts, as under the 2/3 rule, underlying Figure 8.
In FY00, Wisconsin made an important move toward integrating the MPCP with these enrollmentdriven formulas, by excluding voucher enrollment from the calculation of MPS revenue limits and
general school aid. However, Wisconsin was unable to make a full break from the system under which
it began. The MPCP funding mechanism continues to deduct aid from MPS for voucher expenses, even
though the general aid formulas no longer allocate any funds to MPS for voucher students. Since MPS
is allowed to recoup these funds by raising the property tax, the net result is a continuing adverse impact
on Milwaukee property taxpayers. Comparing Figure 9 with Figures 7 and 8, one sees how large the
discrepancy has now become between the existing system and a system that might share the fiscal benefits
of MPCP with Milwaukee.
The history of MPCP illustrates how voucher programs can provide significant taxpayer savings, when
students voluntarily choose programs that draw less on public funds than the schools they would
otherwise attend. However, the same history also illustrates that if the funding formulas are not carefully
constructed, some groups of taxpayers may be adversely affected instead of sharing in the net savings. The
initial funding mechanism may have been well-designed for the purpose at hand, when the program was
small. However, as the program grew, the mechanism carried unintended distributional consequences.
Attempts to reform the mechanism have achieved some success, but the vestiges of the initial system
continue to drive the allocation of burdens and benefits, even as the program has outgrown the funding
system’s origins.
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Appendix A: Review of selected previous literature

As an example of the first phase of the literature, Henry Levin compares the voucher and per pupil MPS
expenditures for FY97.53 Specifically, he considers the claim of Paul Peterson and Chad Noyes “that
Milwaukee voucher schools were receiving only half as much for each student as the Milwaukee Public
Schools.”54 Levin compares the $4,373 voucher with two sorts of figures received from MPS: the system’s
per pupil budgeted expenditure, $7,628, and various site-based expenditures, ranging from $3,042 to
$3,815, depending on grade level. According to Levin, the main sources of the huge difference between
these measures of MPS expenditures are special education and transportation, both funded at the central
office. Levin argues that it is more appropriate to compare the voucher with the site-based expenditures,
but after considering other adjustments, and acknowledging that his calculations do “not constitute a
precise cost-accounting”. He concludes that “the costs of similar services at the school site may favor
slightly the Milwaukee voucher schools.”
After the expansion of the program in FY99 to include religious schools, studies by researchers at the
People for the American Way and the American Federation of Teachers undertook a more detailed
comparison of spending in voucher schools and MPS, and also compared private school tuitions with their
spending and the size of the voucher.55 The objective of this research was to determine if public funds that
went to voucher schools constituted an “overpayment” that might allow the churches to divert funds that
were previously spent on education to other activities, thereby arguably constituting “compelled taxpayer
support of religion.” The heart of the argument went roughly as follows: (1) prior to MPCP, tuitions of
religious schools were below operating costs, so that religious education was subsidized from other church

53

Henry M. Levin (1998), “Educational Vouchers: Effectiveness, Choice, and Costs,” Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management 17 (3), 373-392.

54

Unpublished 1996 paper, “Under Extreme Duress, School Choice Success,” Harvard University Program in Education
Policy and Governance, later published in Diane Ravitch and Joseph Viteritti, eds. New Schools for a New Century: The
Redesign of Urban Education, Yale University Press, 1997. A more recent paper by Peterson (2006), with Nathan Torinus
and Brad Smith, compares the FY05 voucher of $5,943 with a figure of $9,024 for MPS per pupil expenditures, which is a
ratio of 66%.

55

R. Egen, D. Holmes, and E. Mincberg (2000), “The 40 Percent Surcharge: How Taxpayers Overpay for Milwaukee’s Private
School Voucher Program,” Washington, D.C., People for the American Way. F. Howard Nelson, Rachel Egen, Dwight
Holmes (2001), “Revenues, Expenditures and Taxpayer Subsidies in Milwaukee’s Voucher Schools,” paper presented at
the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Education Finance Association.
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revenues; (2) the voucher exceeded the published tuitions existing at many of the religious schools; (3)
therefore vouchers would allow religious institutions to reduce the church subsidy to their schools, freeing
up church funds for non-educational religious purposes. However, since the MPCP voucher is also below
many of these schools’ operating costs (by law it is prohibited from being more), then the expansion of
enrollment in these schools would also require church subsidy. In any case, this line of analysis appears
to have been rendered moot by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Zelman that vouchers for religious
schools did not violate the establishment clause.
More recent analyses of the fiscal impact of MPCP have had a different focus. Instead of focusing on the
impact on the finances of the religious schools, these analyses focused on the impact on the public schools
and taxpayers. Thus, instead of comparing the voucher with the pre-voucher tuition, one returns to the
comparison of the voucher with MPS per pupil expenditures.
Among the more prominent such recent analyses is that of Susan Aud, a Senior Fellow at the Milton
and Rose D. Friedman Foundation.56 This study examines the fiscal impact of all U.S. voucher programs,
including MPCP. For MPCP, the size of the voucher is understood to equal MPS’ per pupil state aid,57
and Aud compares NCES estimates of that figure with instructional expenditures per student in MPS.
The difference is found to fluctuate around $300, so that is the figure that Aud takes to be the per pupil
savings from vouchers. Her aggregate figure is $4.8 million for FY06 and the 16-year total is $28.3
million. Aud then analyzes the MPCP funding formulas to determine how these savings are spread
among taxpayers. Consistent with much public discussion (and the findings of this report), Aud finds that
the fiscal impact has been adverse for Milwaukee taxpayers since 1999. However, other important aspects
of her analysis (the calculated impact on state taxpayers and the exclusion of non-Milwaukee property
taxpayers) seem to be based on an incomplete understanding of Wisconsin’s funding formulas.58

56

“Education by the Numbers: The Fiscal Effect of School Choice Programs, 1990-2006,” Milton & Rose D. Friedman
Foundation, April 2007.

57

Aud states that “the voucher is limited to the amount of state equalization aid per student received by the Milwaukee
public school district in the same year.” This was originally true, but not since 1999.

58

A few examples: (i) Aud seems to assume that as enrollment shifts, the average aid per pupil shifts with it. This is
incorrect. (ii) Aud makes no mention of the important FY00 change in the funding formula’s treatment of voucher
enrollments, and her analysis does not reflect that change. (iii) The funding formula has automatic adjustments to each
district’s aid and local taxes to make the total aid appropriation match the formula’s distribution. Aud’s analysis does not
seem to reflect this feature.
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Bruce Baker, of the University of Kansas, critiqued Aud’s study for the Think Tank Review Project.59 He
finds that Aud’s analysis “confirm[s] an obvious point,” that the gap between the voucher and per pupil
spending does create potential savings. In fact, his figure for estimated voucher savings in Milwaukee is
$38.6 million in FY0560, which is $2,674 per voucher student -- about 9 times the figure given by Aud.
Baker has two main criticisms of Aud’s conclusions. First, potential savings are relatively small, compared
to total current expenditures for the state: his figure for Wisconsin is 0.46% in FY05. This simply
follows from the fact that although the voucher students comprise a sizeable portion of Milwaukee’s
total enrollments (about 13% that year), they are a negligible portion of statewide enrollments. Second,
Baker argues that although the voucher program may provide the “opportunity” for MPS to reduce
its expenditures, he believes this result is unlikely or at least uncertain. However, Wisconsin’s revenue
limits statute, combined with the MPCP statute (as it has existed since FY00), does in fact reduce MPS
expenditures correspondingly.

59

Review of “School Choice by the Numbers: The Fiscal Effects of School Choice Programs 1990-2006,” Education Policy
Research Unit, Arizona State University, May 2007.

60

This figure, which is provided in Baker’s Table 5, assumes “no change to local share.”
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Appendix B: Further Details in Funding Formulas
This appendix considers various details of the funding formulas that are omitted from the text. While a
number of these features are important for short-term effects, they do not have a material impact on the
long-term properties that are our concern.

(i)

Revenue limit vs. actual revenues. Although districts are not required to raise local levies up to
the amount allowed by the revenue limit, in practice that is what almost all districts do, including
Milwaukee.61 That is why, in the text, we do not make a distinction between actual revenues and
the revenue limit.

(ii)

The timing of the enrollment measure. In the Revenue Limit formula, enrollment is a threeyear moving average of September FTE’s, including the current year.62 This has no effect on the
evolution over time of the per pupil revenue limit, p, since the increments are specified legislatively
(except as indicated in (iii) below).
The enrollment measure for Equalization Aid is of the prior year only (average of September and
January FTE’s). This would, in general, be comparable to the Revenue Limit’s three-year average,
since that would approximate the year on which it is centered (the prior year) during periods of
steady (or negligible) enrollment growth or decline. Thus, the E’s in (3) and (4) are not quite
the same as in (2), but are close: for FY02-FY07 they never differed by more than 0.5%, and the
average difference was under 0.2%. More importantly, in considering the fully-phased in effect of
changes in enrollment (as is our focus), there is no material difference between these two measures.

(iii)

Recurring exemptions to the revenue limit. There are some exemptions which get added to
the revenue limit and remain in the base figures for the following year’s calculations. These
exemptions are usually small. For Milwaukee, the only significant recurring exemption recently
has been for revenues to cover “transfer of service,” which typically refers to costs of students with
serious disabilities, over and above what is reimbursed from categorical aids. It has the effect
of raising Milwaukee’s Δpt above the state-specified increment. Thus, in FY07, Milwaukee’s p

61

Statewide, approximately 99.8% of revenue limit capacity is used. In recent years, Milwaukee has used 100.0%. Note
also that if a district does set revenues below its limit, it can carry over the entire underlevy that is due to a recurring
exemption (see (iii) below).

62

Summer school enrollment is also counted, as a 40% FTE, although this is typically negligible. This is also true for
Equalization Aid’s enrollment measure, discussed below.
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rose by $288 (from $8,545 to $8,833) vs. $257 for the state-specified increment. The extra $31
represents the per pupil effect of FY06’s $3.0 M “transfer of service” exemption, carried forward
on a per pupil basis. Again, this has no material effect on the analysis of MPCP’s fiscal impact.

(iv)

Non-recurring exemptions to the revenue limit. These are exemptions that get added to the
revenue limit for the year in which they occur, but are not retained in the base figures for the
following year’s calculation. The key example here (the only one that has applied recently to
Milwaukee) is for enrollment declines. If a district’s enrollment measure (a three-year average)
declines in any given year, there is a one-year adjustment to the revenue limit offsetting that
decline. Over the long haul, a permanent drop in enrollment will be fully reflected in the revenue
limit, as indicated in equation (2), but the impact is effectively phased in over time, due to the
combination of the three-year averaging and this non-recurring exemption. Thus, the one-year
impact of this exemption can be significant, but not for the purpose of evaluating long-run policy
impacts.63

(v)

What state and local funds are covered by revenue limits. On the state side, the revenue limit
covers “General School Aid,” which includes Equalization Aid (the main state formula aid) and
two much smaller programs. Statewide Equalization Aid totaled $4,620.4 M in FY07, and
Milwaukee received $637.9 M. The two smaller pieces of General School Aid are Integration Aid
(payments for intradistrict and interdistrict pupil transfers to facilitate integration) and Special
Adjustment Aid (a form of hold harmless payments). Statewide, these programs totaled $89.0 M
and $13.3 M respectively in FY07, of which Milwaukee received $49.1 M of the former and none
of the latter. As stated earlier, revenue limits do not cover categorical aid, which totaled $572 M
statewide in FY07.
On the local side, the revenue limit covers levies for general operations, as well as certain capital
projects and debt service, 64 but not others (e.g. debt approved by voter referendum and levies for
“community services”).

63

In the last few years Milwaukee’s enrollment declines have accelerated, reaching 2,127 and 2,767 for the three-year
averages used in FY07 and FY08 respectively. Coupled with the rise in the per pupil revenue limit, this led to a rise in
this exemption to $14.1 M in FY07. Milwaukee was not alone: in FY07, 245 of the state’s 424 districts received such an
adjustment. Beginning in FY08, the legislature raised the offset from 75% to 100%, and Milwaukee’s exemption rose to
$25.3 M.

64

The revenue limit includes a piece of the local levy that is reimbursed by the state in order to exempt computers from
the locally funded property tax base.

The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008

41

42

February 2008

In short, the revenue limit covers almost all the state and local revenues that would be affected by
MPCP. The main exception is categorical aids.

(vi)

Shared cost vs. revenue limit. The Equalization Aid formula uses the concept of “Shared Cost,”
which is close but not identical to the Revenue Limit. Some of the differences include the
difference between expenditures and revenues, and the treatment of payments-in-lieu of taxes.
On average, these differences result in less than 1% discrepancy between shared cost per pupil
and revenue limit per pupil. A larger difference is that shared costs are based on the previous
year’s expenditures for the determination of the current year’s Equalization Aid, whereas the
current year’s Revenue Limit includes an increment to the previous year’s per pupil figure. Again,
however, this should not distort the analysis of the long-run impact of changes in enrollment, such
as those occasioned by MPCP.
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Appendix C: Equations Underlying Tables and Figures
Table 3 and Figure 7
The revenue limit calculations of Table 3 are based on these equations:65

This frees up pMΔEM - pxΔEx in aid, which is split among property taxpayers in all districts:66

and each district’s aid is adjusted upward accordingly:

In the bottom half of Table 3, the net benefits are decomposed as follows:

The first term on the right-hand side is the reduction in spending on those students who switch, and the
second term is the spending on vouchers for students who would not have attended MPS.

65

Note that the changes we are considering are relative to having no vouchers. Thus ΔEx is actually Ex. Also, the
enrollment change for Milwaukee ΔEM, is defined in absolute value, rather than algebraic.

66

There is a slight complication due to the reduction in Wisconsin’s total public enrollment, which will slightly raise the
average valuation per pupil, v3. Strictly speaking, the analyses in this paper hold v3 constant and only let v2 vary. The
impact of this simplification is a very slight distortion of the distribution of levies between Milwaukee and the other
districts.

The Fiscal Impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in Milwaukee and Wisconsin, 1993-2008

43

44

February 2008

Table 4 and Figure 8
Given ΔRM from (7), the 2/3 rule implies

and each district’s aid is adjusted upward accordingly:

Table 5 and FY94-99 in Figure 9
During this period, Milwaukee’s revenue limits include the voucher students, so
RM = pM∙(EM + Ex ), and

The expressions for changes in local levies and aid reflect the MPCP aid deduction and levy substitution,
as well as the 2/3 rule:
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Table 6 and FY00-01 in Figure 9
Voucher students were removed from revenue limits, so we have (7) again, for ΔRM.
The expressions for changes in local levies and aid reflect the split of the MPCP aid deduction between
Milwaukee and other districts (denoted as ~M). The expressions also reflect the 2/3 rule, including the
addition of aid for 2/3 of the MPCP levy hike:

Table 7-8 and FY02-07 in Figure 9
The revenue limit calculation is unchanged from (7II). The expressions for changes in local levies and
aid reflect the elimination of the MPCP deduction from non-Milwaukee districts and the adjustment of
Milwaukee’s deduction to 45%. The expressions also reflect the removal of the MPCP levy hike from the
2/3 rule.
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